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Abstract: According to an intuitive claim, in saying that one sees a picture’s sub-
ject, i.e., what a picture presents, in the picture’s vehicle, i.e., the picture’s physical
basis, by ‘in’ one does notmean the spatial relation of being in, as holding between
such items in the real space. For the picture’s subject is knowingly not in the real
space where one veridically sees the picture’s vehicle. Some theories of pictorial
experience have actually agreed with this intuition by claiming that the picture’s
subject lies in a pictorial space of its own, disconnected from the real space that
includes the picture’s vehicle. Yet, not only linguistic evidence suggests that when
used as above, ‘in’ means precisely that very relation, but an appropriate theory
of pictorial experience can justify the above claim.
1. The problem
The Church of St. George in Montemerano (Tuscany, Italy) houses a curi-
ous late Gothic painting, The Virgin of the Cat Flap, that is so named for
(as the tradition says) one of the church’s curates opened a hole in it in order
to let cats pass through. Clearly enough, the hole is a real, not a depicted, one
(unlike, say, Holy Holey Wholey Vessels, a 2015 painting by Suzan
Sommers, which presents as its subject some holey female bodies). This
makes people intuitively think that in saying that we see a hole in that pic-
ture, we do not mean the same as in saying that we see a Madonna in it.
As regards that picture, we see a hole in its vehicle, i.e., its physical basis,
as much as in it we see cracks, cuts, and other physical factors qualifying
the vehicle per se. In other terms, we see a hole as something that is out there,
as standing in the spatial relation of being in with the other item we overall
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see; namely, the very vehicle itself. Just as in the case of cracks, cuts, and
other physical factors.1 Yet, we see a Madonna in the picture just as we
see in it a wooden base on which the Virgin stands up and a curtain behind
the Virgin herself; namely, as what constitutes the picture’s subject, i.e., the
scene that the picture presents, yet it is not out there.
Some important theories of pictorial experience have agreed with this in-
tuition. Indeed, along with Wollheim (1980, 1987, 1998), one may say that
pictorial experience is a sui generis experience of twofold seeing in in which,
by virtue of seeing that picture’s vehicle in the configurational fold of that ex-
perience, in that very vehicle, we somehow discern a Madonna and the
above other things, in the recognitional fold of that experience. This seem-
ingly stresses that no spatial relation of being in actually holds between the
picture’s vehicle and all such things constituting the picture’s subject, the
scene where all such things figure as its constituents. Indeed, Wollheim
(1987, pp. 46, 62, 1998, p. 266) himself claims that the picture’s subject is
seen in a pictorial space that is completely disconnected from the real space.2
Thus, whatever belongs to the picture’s subject is seen in the picture, not in
the sense we appeal to when we say that a physical element is seen in the pic-
ture’s vehicle, i.e., as an element that stands in the being in relation with the
vehicle.
Yet these intuitions notwithstanding, note that we may well say the
following:
1 I see a Madonna in the picture, as well as a hole.
Bymeans of the implicit anaphoric link that affects the preposition ‘in’ oc-
curring twice in (1), both explicitly (after ‘Madonna’) and implicitly (after ‘a
hole’), (1) seemingly shows that ‘in’ occurs twice in order to mean precisely
the same spatial relation of being in, as being instantiated twice in the same
circumstance.
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Note that this use of ‘in’ in (1) is not isolated at all. Suppose that the Tus-
can fresco were very damaged, in such a way that a fissure divided the parts
of the picture that respectively present the Madonna’s head and the Ma-
donna’s torso. One may then say:
2 In the picture, I see both aMadonna’s head and, under the fissure, her
torso.
Or even suppose both that the subject of that fresco also contained a cat as
crouched under the Madonna and that a real cat emerged from the flap.
Then one may say:
3 I see two cats in the picture.
In this paper, I want first of all to show that these uses are not weird at all.
Appearances notwithstanding, in all the three above sentences, ‘in’ must be
taken as meaning the very same spatial relation of being in, as occurring ei-
ther between elements in the picture’s vehicle or between the picture’s vehicle
itself and elements of the picture’s subject. Moreover, this commonality of
meaning is not accidental at all. For there is a way of accounting for the na-
ture of pictorial experience that justifies why, so meant, the above uses are
correct. According to this way, pictorial experience still is a twofold seeing
in à laWollheim, whose folds however are, respectively, a veridical percep-
tion of the picture’s vehicle (the configurational fold) and an illusory, but not
delusory, perception of the picture’s subject (the recognitional fold). In ve-
ridically perceiving the vehicle, one also knowingly nonveridically perceives
the subject, as lying in a region of the real space that departs from where the
vehicle is located. First, since the recognitional fold is nonveridical, the sub-
ject’s elements are only seen as standing in that region. Second, one knows
that such a fold is nonveridical, precisely because in the configurational fold,
one veridically sees that the picture’s vehicle stands at a certain boundary of
that region.
The architecture of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I will try to show
how, from a linguistic point of view, the main possible replies against the
idea that ‘in’ is used literally throughout (1), as well as (2) and (3), can be
countered. In Section 3, I will provide an account of pictorial perception that
shows why such a use is legitimate.
2. The failure of the replies against the linguistic evidence
To begin with, a defender of the specific use of ‘in’ as regards pictorial expe-
rience may reply as follows against the alleged linguistic evidence in favor of
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the literality of ‘in’ in the above sentences, particularly in (1). Anaphoric
links do not require identity of meaning in the expressions used, as the fol-
lowing examples show:
4 I drank a bottle and then I smashed it.
5 Norman Mailer likes to read himself.
In (4), the pronoun ‘it’ designates a container rather than its content, un-
like the term it is anaphorically linked, ‘a bottle’. In (5), ‘himself’ does not
designate Norman Mailer but his works, even if it is anaphorically linked
to the name ‘NormanMailer’, which obviously designates the writer. Hence,
that defender may say that in its second implicit token in (1), ‘in’ does mean
the spatial relation of being in holding between the items, the picture’s vehi-
cle and the hole, that constitute the object of sight that a certain visual per-
ception referred to by the verb ‘see’ is about. Yet in its first explicit token,
‘it’ must be directly attached to the verb ‘see’ as meaning a particular differ-
ent experiential state of seeing in having the Madonna as its object, qua con-
stituent of the picture’s subject.
However, I retort to that defender that, in general, anaphoras allow that
different anaphorically linked tokens of the relevant expressions do not pre-
serve the same meaning only if there is a pragmatic function connecting the
different meanings involved by such tokens.3 Indeed, as regards the above
examples, (4) mobilizes a content–container pragmatic function so that ‘a
bottle’ designates the content of a container, while the pronoun ‘it’ anaphor-
ically linked to it designates that very container, which is pragmatically con-
nected – in this case, metonymically – to that content. Likewise, (5)
mobilizes an author–work pragmatic function so that ‘NormanMailer’ des-
ignates the famous writer, while ‘himself’, though anaphorically linked to it,
designates his works again metonymically connected to the writer. Yet as
regards (1), there is no evidence of a pragmatic function connecting the dif-
ferent meanings of the two tokens of ‘it’ (one explicit, the other implicit) that
(1) allegedly mobilizes.
Granted, there is an exception to the above necessary condition for failure
of cosignificance with anaphoras. In a few cases, meanings for anaphorically
linked tokens of a term differ even when there is no relevant pragmatic func-
tion connecting them. Yet this happens with puns, as in the following
zeugma:
6 After two unsuccessful marriages, I find myself keeping my guard up,
along with my underpants.
This presents a ‘joking together’ (zeugma), since the implicit anaphoric
link occurring in it ties the distinct tokens of the relevant term involved,
‘to keep up’, which, however, have utterly different meanings, i.e., meanings
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that are connected by no pragmatic function. One indeed appreciates the
wittiness of (6)’s utterer in anaphorically linking tokens of a term whose
meaning is utterly different. But (1) is not punny at all. Curious if you like
but not punny. The anaphoric link tying the two tokens of ‘it’ in (1) makes
no shared joke arise, as instead should if the meanings of such tokens were
utterly different. There is indeed no wittiness in uttering (1).4
In order to better see the point, consider the difference between the follow-
ing two sentences. The first exhibits what is taken to be the most famous
zeugma in English.5
7 She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan chair.
Where the preposition ‘in’ is used twice with different meanings. The sec-
ond is a sentence basically analogous to (1) that one may utter in reporting
one’s pictorial experience when facing Alberto Burri’s 1953 abstract paint-
ing Sackcloth, which results out of producing a certain collage on an already
torn jute sack.
8 I see a landscape in the picture as well as a hole.6
One may appreciate the wittiness of uttering ‘in’ twice with different
meanings in (7). Yet no such appreciation may occur as regards (8), for it
presents no zeugma at all.
Let me stress that (8) is perfectly alike (1). For, unlike the aforementioned
Holy Holey Wholey Vessels, the hole one talks about in it does not contrib-
ute to determine the picture’s subject. Granted, a physical hole might be
exploited as having a depictive value, as when natural cavities in a deranged
building are flanked by the depiction of a nose and of a mouth in order for a
face to be overall seen in that building. But in Sackcloth, the hole that is al-
ready there has no such value. It is just a physical feature of the juta sack,
among with other such physical features having no depictive value whatso-
ever (say, the sack’s weight).
At this point, the defender of the specific use of ‘in’ as regards pictorial ex-
perience may retort that the linguistic datum at stake has been improperly
accommodated. For in (1), the relevant meaning shift affects not only the
preposition ‘in’ but also the syntagm ‘the picture’. In (1′)’s first part, ‘the pic-
ture’ is indeed used tomean the picture as an interpreted item, i.e., the vehicle
plus its depictive content (the icon, to give it a name), not the mere vehicle
itself. This is rather meant by the second implicit token of that syntagm.7
Hence, unlike the second implicit token of ‘in’, its first explicit token in (1)
does not mean the spatial relation of being in, but it has an utterly different
meaning (whatever it is).
First of all, however, it is implausible that the first token of ‘the picture’ in
(1) is used to mean the icon rather than the mere picture’s vehicle. Most
I SEE NOT ONLY AMADONNA, BUT ALSO A HOLE, IN THE PICTURE 5
© 2019 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2019 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
theoreticians indeed agree that what is seen in the picture is actually seen in
its vehicle.8 Moreover, this move is unhelpful for that defender. For if in its
tokens of (1), the whole locution ‘in the picture’ had utterly different mean-
ings, i.e., pragmatically disconnected meanings, the anaphoric link between
such tokens would remain totally unexplained since (1), as we saw before, is
not punny at all.
At this point, the defender of the specific use of ‘in’ as regards pictorial ex-
perience may counterreply that even if the picture’s vehicle is mobilized
twice in (1), both as regards the seen-in Madonna and as regards the hole
seen in it, it is so mobilized in different ways. For as regards the Madonna,
one mobilizes the vehicle’s design properties, i.e., the properties that are re-
sponsible for the fact that a certain subject is seen in it, while as regards
the hole, one mobilizes the vehicle’s mere surface properties, i.e., its physical
properties that play no depictive role.9 Thus, (1) is actually used to mean:
(1′) I see aMadonna in the vehicle’s design properties and a hole in the ve-
hicle’s mere surface properties.10
To begin with, I am unclear whether this reading accounts for the anaph-
ora in (1), for again it is hard to see a pragmatic relationship between mere
surface properties and design properties. Indeed, the two kinds of properties
do not seem to covariate: paintings made by the same material can have dif-
ferent design properties and vice versa. However, let me grant that one may
read (1) as (1′). Yet this simply corroborates the hypothesis that ‘in’ is not
ambiguous in it. For both the design properties and the mere surface prop-
erties are properties of the vehicle: the former are (basically) the vehicle’s
colors and shapes, while the latter are its typically material properties. So,
meaning (1) as (1′) precisely strengthens the idea that both the Madonna
(qua part of the picture’s subject) and the hole (qua part of the picture’s ve-
hicle) are seen as standing in the vehicle.
At this point, the defender of the specific use of ‘in’ as regards pictorial
experience may put forward a less radical alternative reading of (1). For
she may rejoinder that (1) do mobilize a pragmatic function, yet this func-
tion does not connect allegedly different meanings of ‘in’, but only the dif-
ferent references that the tokens of ‘in’ in (1) possess, as qualifying its
truth–conditional content. Indeed, first of all, the second implicit token
of ‘in’ refers to a certain portion of the real space, while the first explicit
token shifts its reference to a certain portion of the (altogether different)
pictorial space, although it keeps the same meaning as the second one.
As I said at the very beginning, this is the space that some theories of pic-
torial experience postulate as the sui generis locus where the events that are
presented in the relevant pictorial experience are supposed to happen. So,
there is indeed a difference between the real and the pictorial space. Yet
this difference affects just the reference, but not the meaning, of ‘in’. In
this respect, (1) is used to mean the same as
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(1″) I see a Madonna in the picture there, as well as a hole (in the picture)
here.
Moreover, that defender may go on saying, this referential shift is possible
for this time there is a pragmatic connection linking such referents. Indeed,
the pictorial space is dependent on the real space. Depending on how things
are configurated in the real space, things are correspondingly configurated in
the pictorial space. Indeed, once one alters how the spots lying in the real
space where the picture’s vehicle is also located are spatially related, a differ-
ent such relation also occurs as far as the things one grasps in the pictorial
space are concerned. For example, if one changes a tiny part of a flesh-col-
ored spot into a black long spot in a certain area of the vehicle of Leonardo’s
La Gioconda, one passes from seeing in it an enigmatic feminine figure to
seeing, in the resulting vehicle of Marcel Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q., an enig-
matic moustached feminine figure. Hence, coming back to (1), even if the
two involved tokens of ‘in’ have the same meaning, the first, explicit, token
of ‘in’ refers to the spatial relation of being in occurring in the real space,
while the second, implicit, token of ‘in’ refers to the same spatial relation
yet occurring in the pictorial space. As the paraphrasis of (1) into (1″) shows,
‘in’ works there as an indexical expression that, the anaphorical link not-
withstanding, contextually shifts its reference for pragmatic reasons while
however preserving its linguistic meaning. In this respect, things in (1) stand
just as in the following case:
9 Tomorrow I attend a performance of Richard III: In battle, think of
me and drop your useless sword.
Although in (9) the different tokens of the indexicals ‘tomorrow’ and ‘I’ re-
spectively have the same linguistic meaning, the first token of ‘tomorrow’ re-
fers to a real day while its second, implicit, token refers to a fictional day;
likewise, the first token of ‘I’ refers to a real agent while the second token of
that indexical (‘me’) refers to a fictional agent. For the fictional temporal se-
quence and the fictional agent are pragmatically connectedwith the real tem-
poral sequence and the real agent, respectively, since the former are
respectively parasitic on the latter. Indeed, these fictional parameters inherit
the dependence on real parameters that fiction in general has on reality, both
epistemologically and ontologically, as Walton (1990) taught us. From the
epistemological point of view, one could not make believe something if one
could not believe that something. From an ontological point of view, some-
thing can be fictionally true – e.g., that there are three bears over there – only
if something (else) is really true – that there are three stumps over there. Thus,
a pragmatically relevant context shiftmakes it the case that in (9) ‘tomorrow’
(in its explicit and in its anaphorically linked implicit token, respectively)
passes from referring to the day after the really present day to referring to
the day after the fictionally present day, while ‘I’ (in its first and its second
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anaphorically linked token, respectively) passes from referring to the real
agent to referring to the fictionally relevant agent, i.e., the Ghost of
Clarence.11
Yet to begin with, I may object as follows to this weaker variant of the de-
fense of the specific use of ‘in’ as regards pictorial experience. In order to ap-
ply this solution to the case of ‘in’ in (1), one must assume that the picture’s
vehicle is an element of the pictorial space with which, in that space, a con-
stituent of the picture’s subject, i.e., the Virgin, stands in the relation of being
in: just as the real hole (1) talks about stands in that relation with the real ve-
hicle of The Virgin of the Cat Flap in the real space. But this assumption is
rather implausible. Fans of pictorial space normally take it as being the fig-
urative space just containing the elements constituting the picture’s sub-
ject.12 Quite plausibly, that space is given perspectivally, i.e., as containing
an internal perspective.13 Yet no pictorial vehicle figures as one of its
elements.
Granted, the defender of this weaker variant may reply that (1″) must
be meant differently, as involving no relationship between the picture’s
vehicle and any element of the picture’s subject. For ‘in the picture there’
and ‘in the picture here’ must be, respectively, meant as saying the same
as ‘in that region of the pictorial space’ and ‘in that region of the real
space’.14
But even so meant, moreover, this weaker variant is implausible for an-
other and more important reason. Let me start from remarking that, in a
standard illusory perception, one may nonveridically see an element mis-
taken for something else as standing in the being in relation with another
such element in the real space. For example, when one mistakes a rope for
a snake, one may nonveridically sees the part of the rope that one mistakes
for an illusory snake’s eye as being, in the real space, in another part of the
rope that one mistakes for an illusory snake’s head. So, at time t, one may
report one’s unknowingly illusory perception by saying
10 I see an eye in the snake’s head.
While at time t′, once recovered from that illusion, one may report one’s
different veridical perception by saying
11 I see a ring in the rope’s top.
Now, nobody would question that ‘in’ is used in the same literal way both
in (10) and in (11) as referring to the same portion of the real space. Yet
moreover, the same exactly happens in another more sophisticated case of
illusory perception; namely, when one mistakes a genuine trompe-l’oeil for
what actually is the subject of the picture that experientially emerges in the
pictorial experience one entertains after the realization of the mistake.
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Consider in particular a case of a genuine trompe-l’oeil that mobilizes merely
depicted holes. If at time t one mistakes a pavement actually presenting a
depicted hole for a pavement containing a real hole, one may utter,
12 I see a hole in the pavement,
by taking the pavement’s part that one mistakes for a hole as being, in the
real space, in the remaining part of the pavement. Suppose that at time t′ one
realizes that one is facing a trompe-l’oeil, thereby realizing that the hole in
question is just constituting the experientially emerging picture’s subject:
the picture, whose vehicle is the paved land, vividly presents a hole. In that
condition, one may utter (12) again, by now taking the pavement just as that
picture’s vehicle. Indeed, in its second utterance, (12) no longer reports an il-
lusory perception but a pictorial experience. Yet in both utterances, ‘in’ goes
on referring to the same portion of the real space.
Note that one does not even have to appeal to Burge-inspired consider-
ations (as in the case of ‘arthritis’) in order to claim that one’s epistemic con-
dition does not affect the reference of the word one uses in the relevant
reports of one’s intentional states. For in the case of (10) and (11), it would
be weird to say that one’s epistemic change – the fact that one passes from il-
lusorily perceiving a snake to veridically perceiving a rope – yields a semantic
change in the reference of the preposition ‘in’. Mutatis mutandis, the same
holds in the case of the two utterances of (12). It would be likewise weird to
hold that a mere epistemic change – the fact that one passes from an illusory
perception of a trompe l’oeil to a pictorial experience of that trompe l’oeil –
yields a semantic change, in that the token of ‘in’ in the second utterance of
(12) passes to refer to a pictorial spatial relation instead of going on referring
to a real spatial relation, as in the first utterance of (12). Thus, in the second
utterance of (12), which reports a pictorial experience, no referential shift to a
portion of an alleged pictorial space affects the preposition ‘in’. Mutatis
mutandis, the same holds as regards the first explicit token of ‘in’ in (1), which
(inter alia)makes the same kind of report: the report of a pictorial experience.
At this point, the defender of the specificity of the use of ‘in’ as regards pic-
torial experience may try a final move, which is in line with the one that I
have considered at the very beginning of this section. If one claims that in
(1) ‘in’ is not ambiguous in its two tokens, one is forced to say that ‘see’ is
ambiguous in its two tokens, one explicit and the other implicit. For the
whole locution ‘see in’ is ambiguous there in its two tokens (again, one ex-
plicit and the other implicit). The first token contributes tomean a nonfactive
state of seeing: one sees that a Madonna is in the picture’s vehicle, yet she is
not there. On the contrary, the second token contributes to mean a factive
state of seeing: one sees that a hole is in the picture’s vehicle, and so it is.
Yet if ‘see in’ is ambiguous as a whole, there is no way of showing that this
ambiguity depends either on the ambiguity of its first component (‘to see’) or
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of its second component (‘it’). Thus, the possibility that ‘in’ is ambiguous in
(1) remains open.
Yet to begin with, one is not forced to assume that ‘see in’ is ambiguous in
(1). For ‘to see’may be not ambiguous in it if it merely means the same as ‘to
have a visual experience’, while ‘it’ also keeps its own meaning throughout
(1).15 This general nonfactive reading of ‘to see’ is an alternative reading that
is mostly appreciated among nonphilosophers (see Bourget, 2019, p. 382).
Indeed, we have seen this reading at work in (10) and (11), which respectively
report an illusory, hence nonveridical, and a veridical perception.Moreover,
it would be weird that ‘to see’were ambiguous in (1). For as regards the sim-
ilar reports of other intentional states, the relevant word means one and the
same intentional state, independently of whether this is successful or not.
Consider
13 I desire a hole in the cheese as well as in the sun.
Itmay be that the first state of desire (13) talks about is a successful state of
desire, while the second state it talks about is an unsuccessful such state. Yet,
‘to desire’ is not ambiguous in it. Thus, there is no reason to hold that ‘desir-
ing in’ is ambiguous in it so as to force one to ask whether such an ambiguity
depends on an ambiguity of ‘to desire’ or on an ambiguity of ‘in’. Indeed, ‘in’
is certainly not ambiguous in it.Mutatis mutandis, the same holds as regards
‘see in’ in (1).
3. The solution
Thus, what originally seemed to be just a debatable linguistic evidence has
turned out to be a rather strong one. In (1), the very same spatial relation
of being in is designated both by the explicit token and by the anaphorically
linked implicit token of ‘in’, even if that relation is actually instantiated in
the second case, where its relata are the picture’s vehicle and the hole, but
not in the first case, where its relata are again the picture’s vehicle and the
picture’s subject.16 Neither a meaning shift nor a pragmatically determined
referential shift occurs in (1) as far as ‘in’ is concerned.
Now, the original appearances notwithstanding, one might think that this
linguistic result is rather trivial. For undoubtedly ‘in’ means the very same
spatial relation of being in in both tokens of (1), since ‘a Madonna’ does
not refer there to a component of the picture’s subject. Instead, it shifts its
reference to a component of the picture’s vehicle – a (partial) pictorial repre-
sentation of aMadonna – in order to say that such a component is located in
the very vehicle. There is plenty of evidence that often that shift occurs, as
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when one says that there is a lion in the garden, meaning that there is a lion
representation (a statue of a lion) in it.17
Yet, although that referential shift certainly exists in general, various peo-
ple – e.g., Lopes, 2010 – doubt that it occurs in sentences like (1). And in-
deed, the case of (12) shows that this is hardly the case. Beforehand, we
saw that, as regards the two tokens of ‘in’ respectively involved in the utter-
ances of (12) uttered while entertaining a mere illusory perception and a pic-
torial experience, respectively, that epistemic change hardly involves a
semantic change. A fortiori, this is the case as regards the two tokens of
‘hole’ involved in such utterances. But this means that the second token does
not shift its reference to a hole representation. Mutatis mutandis, the same
holds of ‘a Madonna’ in (1): it still refers to a component of the picture’s
subject.
Thus first of all, this linguistic result is not trivial at all. Interestingly
enough, it has the independent merit of showing that, as far as basically 2-
D picture’s vehicles are concerned, the spatial relation of being in in question
does not shrink to a mere containment relation.18 First, note that when one
says that one sees a real hole in a picture’s vehicle, one does not strictly
speaking mean that the hole is contained in the vehicle but rather that, while
the hole’s surface coincides with the vehicle’s surface, the hole itself is, so to
speak, extended beyond the vehicle’s own thickness. Suppose indeed again,
as I did in the previous section, that the hole is filled by a passing cat. Then
one may utter:
14 I see a cat in the picture,
meaning that one sees a cat in the portion of the real space extending
typically behind the vehicle’s own thickness. I say ‘typically’, for sometimes
what is seen in the vehicle may also be extended in front of the vehicle’s
own thickness. Indeed, one may utter (14) also when only the back part
of the cat is still contained by the vehicle, the rest standing in front of it.
Second, if the very same spatial relation is actually mobilized also when
a picture’s subject is concerned, as with (1), this means that such a subject
is seen as occupying a region of the real space that is typically extended
behind the vehicle’s own surface. Indeed, in The Virgin of the Cat Flap,
the Virgin is seen as being immediately behind the picture’s vehicle, but
the curtain is seen as far behind, while the wooden base is seen as extend-
ing from the vehicle’s surface up to the curtain. I again say ‘typically’, for
sometimes the picture’s subject is instead seen as extending in front of the
picture’s vehicle, as with merely protruding pictures, or even both ways, as
with Pere Borrell del Caso’s Escaping Criticism. In this case, we see the left
leg of the boy the picture presents as being behind the location where the
canvas is, whereas his torso is seen as standing in that very location, and
yet his head, his left hand, and his right foot are seen as standing in front
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of it, in order to convey the overall impression that the boy is getting out
of the picture. In this respect, suppose that, along with what I hypothe-
sized in the previous section, the Montemerano fresco were modified as
regards its subject by adding the depiction of a forward-moving cat as
crouched under the Madonna. Then, in the above situation when one ut-
ters (14) in order to talk of a real cat, we could even have a report also
involving the depicted cat, with ‘to see’ in its aforementioned nonfactive
meaning to have a visual experience.
15 I see two passing cats in the picture.
Yet moreover, the above linguistic evidence would not be conclusive if
there were no theory of pictorial experience that supplied it with an ultimate
justification. Language use is often affected by vagueness of meaning. Thus,
the fact that we have reports such as the above ones would remain a sort of
linguistic curiosity, if we did not have a theory of pictorial experience that
explains why we so express ourselves in such reports.
Fortunately enough, there is such a theory. Partially at least, the experi-
ence of seeing something in a picture’s vehicle is what the above case of real-
izing that something is a genuine trompe l’oeil reveals: a knowingly illusory
perception of the picture’s vehicle as the picture’s subject. I say ‘partially’,
for pictorial experience also includes the veridical perception of the picture’s
vehicle. Indeed, according to this theory, pictorial experience is twofold, just
as in Wollheim’s seeing in. In the first, configurational, fold, one veridically
perceives the picture’s vehicle. In the second, recognitional, fold, one illuso-
rily, hence nonveridically, perceives the picture’s subject.Moreover, this illu-
sory perception is a knowingly illusory one. The experiencer perceptually
knows that the picture’s subject is not there, precisely because she also per-
ceptually knows that the picture’s vehicle is there. Thus in the recognitional
fold, the picture’s subject is nonveridically seen as standing in the picture’s
vehicle, just as in the aforementioned illusory perception reported by the first
utterance of (12), in which onemistakes (a part of) a genuine trompe l’oeil for
what actually is (a part of) the subject of the experientially emerging pic-
ture.19 Like that perception, the recognitional fold is illusory. Indeed, the
picture’s subject is illusorily seen in the picture’s vehicle. These two items
are taken as instantiating in the real space the being in relation; yet of course,
since the perception is illusory, they are not actually instantiating that rela-
tion.20 Instead, what actually instantiate that relation are further real phys-
ical items the picture’s vehicle is actually spatially connected with, such as,
e.g., real holes (as in The Virgin of the Cat Flap): the items that are percep-
tually and veridically grasped in the configurational fold of the pictorial ex-
perience. In this theoretical framework, speaking of a pictorial space, as
Wollheim himself did as we saw before, is simply an improper way of talking
of the real space: the pictorial space is just the real space as it would have
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been if the recognitional fold had been not illusory. Yet, unlike the afore-
mentioned illusory perception, the recognitional fold is a knowingly illusory
perception. Indeed, one knows that the picture’s subject is not out there. For
one knows that what is out there is actually another thing; namely, the pic-
ture’s vehicle itself that one knowingly sees in the other yet veridical config-
urational fold of the pictorial experience.21
Interestingly enough, in so explaining the linguistic data, this theory of
pictorial experience is better than a similar theory in the philosophical
market. According to this other theory (Kulvicki, 2009; Newall, 2015),
pictorial experience is a form of seeing through, where the background ob-
ject is seen (maybe nomologically impossibly) as merely behind (or even
merely in front of) the transparent layer. In Hopkins’s (2012, p. 656)
terms, seeing in taken as seeing through (problematically) amounts to (1)
representing P (the picture’s vehicle) as at distance δ1 from one’s point
of view and (2) representing O (the picture’s subject) as at distance δ2 from
one’s point of view, where δ1 ≠ δ2.
This theory certainly bears a similarity with my own theory. For accord-
ing to it, pictorial experience illusorily locates the picture’s subject in the
same real space as the picture’s vehicle. Yet unlike my theory, this theory
does not capture the proper spatial relation that in that experience holds be-
tween the picture’s vehicle and the picture’s subject. In the recognitional fold
of pictorial experience, the picture’s subject is (knowingly) illusorily seen as
extending from the area inwhich the picture’s vehicle is veridically seen in the
configurational fold of that experience, as standing either backwards (as in
standard pictures) or forwards (as in merely protruding pictures) or even
both (as in the Escaping Criticism case).22 This shows why, unlike that the-
ory, my theory can properly explain the linguistic evidence that sentences
like (1) present.
4. Conclusion
To sum up, appearances notwithstanding, we must take as correct a given
linguistic evidence purportedly showing that we literally use the preposition
‘in’ as still meaning the spatial relation of being in also when saying that we
see the picture’s subject in the picture’s vehicle. Such a correctness does not
only depend on the fact that from the linguistic point of view, it is very hard
to dispense with that evidence. It also and more importantly depends on the
fact that the relation that is grasped in the pictorial experience as holding be-
tween the picture’s subject and the picture’s vehicle is exactly that spatial re-
lation. Or so my theory claims.23
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NOTES
1 For the purposes of this paper, I assume that ‘in’ has a locativemeaning when applied to a
relation between holes and their physical containers. Obviously enough, however, matters are
more complicated. On this, cf. Casati (2000).
2 In a different theoretical perspective, also Spinicci (2012) endorses this claim.
3 As originally remarked by Fauconnier (1985) (see most recently Recanati, 2018).
4 Consider how the case differs from another apparently similar case, in whose follow-
ing argument one may feel a sense of paradoxicality: ‘The pain is in my hand, my hand is in
my pocket; therefore, the pain is in my pocket’. One may account for the argument’s sense
of paradoxicality by saying that the argument is invalid. For ‘in’ is ambiguous in its first
and in its second premise since it respectively has an individuative and a locative sense
(Crane, 2001 pp. 81–82). Even in this case, however, there is perhaps no paradoxicality,
hence no ambiguity, at all, if one reads the first premise as saying ‘The pain is as if in
my hand’, thereby also recovering the validity of the argument. See on this Voltolini
(2013, p. 121).
5 According to Westphal (2016, p. 155).
6 As I said, Burri’s masterpiece is an abstract painting. Yet this does not prevent it from
eliciting a pictorial experience just as any paradigmatic figurative painting. For, as Wollheim
(1987, p. 62) himself originally stressed, as regards paintings the abstract–concrete distinction
is orthogonal to the figurative–nonfigurative distinction. See also Geiger (2008).
7 On these different meanings of ‘picture’, cf. Wiesing (2010).
8 Cf., e.g., Husserl (2006), who explicitly holds that what is seen in a picture, the image-ob-
ject as he labels it, is seen in its vehicle, as Brough (2012) underlines. Granted, Husserl distin-
guishes the image–object from the image–subject, taken as what the picture is about. Yet this
is irrelevant for my present purposes.
9 For this property distinction, cf. notoriously Lopes (2005).
10 I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee.
11 For indexical context shift in fictional contexts, cf. Recanati (2000).
12 Cf., e.g., Spinicci (2012).
13 Cf. Hopkins (1998).
14 I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee.
15 As Lopes (1996) holds, both a veridical and a nonveridical form of seeing are cases of vi-
sual experiences as of a F.
16 One might object that the picture’s subject cannot amount to a relatum for the being in re-
lation since there are cases in which the picture’s subject does not exist, as with pictures of uni-
corns. Yet not only one may rebut, with Wollheim (2003), Hyman (2006), and Wiesing
(2010), that nonexistent pictorial subjects are legitimate relata, but one may also take the pic-
ture’s subject as an existent generic item that both pictures of existents and pictures of nonexis-
tent present. Thus, this itemmaywork in both cases as the right-hand side relatum of the being in
relation (cf. Voltolini, 2015.)
17 On such referential shifts, cf., e.g., Recanati, 2004.
18 Unlike 3-D sculpture’s vehicles. In a holey statue, we see both the hole and the sculpture’s
subject as being contained by the sculpture’s vehicle.
19 This is one interpretation of what Wollheim (1987) meant by saying ‘I discern something
standing out in front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else’ (p. 46) (cf. Hyman,
2006, p. 133). Exegetically speaking, this interpretation is incorrect, for Wollheim (2003, p. 3)
himself clarified that, by so saying, he meant that in seeing in, one sees parts of the picture’s sub-
ject as standing behind other parts. Yet by nomeans, these two interpretations are incompatible.
In (knowingly illusorily) seeing the picture’s subject as standing in the picture’s vehicle, one in-
deed sees (knowingly illusorily aswell) some parts of that subject as lying behind some other such
parts.
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20 They instantiate it in the pictorial space once this is merely taken as an evaluation point of
the relevant perception’s content, not as a content-determining point, as in the above rejected
weaker variant of the defense of the specific use of ‘in’ as regards seeing in.
21 For a possibility of articulating such a theory, see Voltolini (2015).
22 For more about this, cf. Voltolini (2017).
23 This paper has been presented at the Anglo-German Picture Group 2019 Workshop, May
31 to 1 June 2019, NYU Florence, at theWork in Progress Seminar, June 13, 2019, Centre for
Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, and at the Claves Seminar, June 24, 2019,
Ca’ Foscari University, Venice. I thank all the participants for their inspiring questions. I also
thank both JohnKulvicki andMarcoNani for some chats about holes in pictures that prompted
me to think more deeply about these issues.
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